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Our paper investigates the unexplored impact of education on inflation and of this 
relationship on economic growth. By using a sample of 102 countries observed on 
non-overlapping five-year data spells over the period 1963-2001, we find that average 
schooling years of the working population have a significant negative impact on 
inflation rates after controlling for the effects of the stance of domestic monetary policy. 
We also show that the negative impact of inflation on growth in conditional 
convergence estimates is significantly increased when the former is instrumented by 
educational variables. Our findings outline a third potential role of human capital on 
conditional convergence. They show that education is not only a production factor or a 
variable which may reduce demographic pressures, but also an important antidote 
against inflationary pressures which, in turn, negatively affect economic growth and 
conditional convergence. We interpret our findings by identifying three potential 
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rationales for the education-inflation nexus: (i) education raises consumers’ awareness 
of their power in contrasting producers’ inflationary pressures; (ii) more educated 
individuals have lower inflationary expectations when they are also wealthier and their 
consumption bundle is relatively less (more) intensive in inferior (superior) goods with 
higher (lower) inflation potential; (iii) more (less) educated and wealthier (less wealthy) 
individuals tend to be net creditors (debtors) in their maturity, thereby contributing to 
increase (reduce) the power of anti-inflationary lobbies. 
 
 







The main branch of the literature on the determinants of the equilibrium level of 
inflation is focused on the issue of central bank independence. According to this 
perspective inflation is the outcome of a game between a more or less independent 
central bank—whose main concerns are price and output stability (in different 
weights)—and market agents, divided or not into different interest groups, with their 
own inflationary expectations. 
This literature has neglected, or not sufficiently investigated, the role of education on 
the formulation of agents’ inflationary expectations and on the final equilibrium level of 
inflation. This neglected role may help to explain some recent anecdotal and descriptive 
evidence showing facts that are difficult to reconcile with standard findings of 
theoretical literature. First, we observe a significant gap between official and perceived 
inflation rates in many countries of the world and we find that perceived inflation is 
significantly and negatively correlated with years of education (Brischetto and De 
Brouwer 1999; Bryan and Ventaku 2001; Lombardelli and Saleheen 2003). Second, we 
have plenty of anecdotal evidence about the difficulties of poorly educated individuals 
in interpreting events that have occurred around currency changes such as the euro 
turnaround (Adriani, Marini and Scaramozzino 2003).1 
These differences between observed facts and model predictions depend on the fact that 
standard theoretical models generally focus on the implications of policy measures 
interacting with the behaviour of a rational representative agent whose choices are based 
on constrained maximization. These models seldom consider that a significant part of 
the population deviates from such standard behaviour for cultural grounds or for 
insufficient education and knowledge of mechanisms regulating the economic system. 
More specifically, it is reasonable to assume that the success in controlling inflation 
depends not only on the quality of monetary policies, but also on agents’ knowledge of 
market mechanisms, such as those of demand elasticity, empowering consumers with 
the possibility of counteracting inflationary pressures in competitive environments. In 
this perspective we argue that education enhances the capacity of individuals to 
understand and use market mechanisms which allow them to contrast inflationary 
pressures and therefore has positive effects on the equilibrium level of inflation.  
This ‘reduced consumer empowerment’ rationale is not the only one which might 
illustrate a significant education-inflation nexus. A second rationale (Engel law) may be 
found by exploring the effects of education on the characteristics of the bundles of 
goods consumed by different income classes. The positive relationship between 
education and personal income is well established in the literature of the returns to 
schooling (Schultz 1988). On the basis of this relationship, it is highly reasonable to 
expect that, ceteris paribus, better educated people should on average belong to higher 
income groups. Another well established empirical regularity, the Engel’s law, explains 
                                                 
1  What we would expect in a system populated by rational agents making their consumption choices in 
(monopolistically) competitive markets with limited search costs (such as, for instance, restaurants in 
big cities) is absence of ‘monetary illusions’ and consequently, no effect whatsoever of currency 
turnarounds on inflation rates. The sharp price changes that have occurred since the euro was 
introduced reveal, on the contrary, that insufficient consumers’ scrutiny prevented them from 
counteracting monopolistically competitive producers’ temptations of exploiting the currency 
turnaround to increase market prices.  
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that as income grows, the share of inferior goods shrinks. Inflation surveys of domestic 
statistical institutes document that inferior goods have inflation rates which tend to be 
higher than average, while an important share of superior goods (such as ICT goods and 
travel) belongs to highly competitive sectors and exhibits inflation rates well below 
average, if not declining prices. Hence, by transitive property, better educated people 
should effectively suffer less from inflation and therefore should formulate lower 
inflationary expectations. The consequence could be that in all those models in which 
inflationary expectations positively affect equilibrium levels of inflation, a higher share 
of the more educated people should lead to lower inflation. 
The positive education-inflation nexus could also be supported by the existence of a 
third ‘creditor’s pressure’ rationale. If the positive relationship between education and 
personal income can also be extended to personal wealth, we should expect that more 
(less) educated and wealthier (less wealthy) people tend to be net creditors (debtors) in 
their maturity. Institutional models of inflation setting have shown, in turn, that the 
relative strength of net creditors (debtors) significantly reduces (increases) equilibrium 
inflation rates (Piga 2000). 
After a short survey of these three theoretical rationales for the existence of   
an education-inflation nexus, the paper explores whether the relationship holds on the 
empirical side. The paper is divided into six sections (including introduction and 
conclusions). In the second section we explore the theoretical underpinnings of the 
education-inflation nexus in the light of the standard inflation setting models. In the 
third section we survey the (scant) evidence on the relationship between education, 
consumption bundles, personal income, personal wealth and inflationary expectations, 
which forms the basis of our three rationales explaining the negative nexus between 
education and inflation. In the fourth section we present empirical evidence on the 
positive relationship between the two variables, net impact of monetary policies, and 
other proxies of the institutional environment. In the fifth section we document how 
consideration of the inflation-education nexus improves the goodness of fit in traditional 
conditional convergence growth estimates. 
2  Theoretical underpinnings of the education-inflation nexus 
In the previous section, we argued that less educated individuals tend to have higher 
inflationary expectations. This finding is consistent with both the ‘consumers’ 
empowerment’ rationale (the less educated are less able to use market mechanism to 
counteract producers price changes and are therefore more pessimistic about inflation) 
and the ‘Engel law’ rationale (the less educated rationally form higher inflationary 
expectations because inflation rate is higher in their consumption bundle).  
The simplest channel through which higher inflationary expectations may affect the 
equilibrium inflation rate is in a model in which the inflation rate is significantly 
affected by industry-specific wage settings. If less educated people have sufficient union 
power, they succeed in getting higher wages and therefore positively contribute to 
higher inflation rates. 
In spite of that, the link between inflationary expectations and actual levels of inflation 
in standard models of the literature on central bank independence is not so clear-cut.  
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Quite to the contrary, standard models à la Rogoff (1985) and Barro and Gordon (1983) 
of inflationary games between an independent institution (central bank or the 
government) whose main concerns are price and output stability (in different weights) 
and a representative market agent which formulates its own inflationary expectations, 
show that, for a given monetary policy stance, lower inflationary expectations do not 
affect the equilibrium inflation rate. This is because in these models the only source of 
inflationary bias is the benevolent planner (or the independent central bank). 
Inflationary expectations enter the benevolent planner’s loss function in proportion to 
the positive weight given by him to inflationary surprises (and, paradoxically, higher 
inflationary expectations reduce room for inflationary surprises). What matters for the 
independent central banker in choosing the optimal inflation rate is just the balance 
between marginal costs of inflation (i.e., distributive costs, etc.) and marginal gains 
from inflationary surprises. 
The absence of a link between inflationary expectations and actual levels of inflation 
obviously depends on the fact that in these models, the central bank is assumed to have 
monopoly power in setting the equilibrium level of inflation and, therefore, higher 
inflationary expectations cannot be traduced into higher wage claims which affect the 
final level of prices. This class of models has been shown to be subject to criticism with 
respect to micro-foundations (Chari, Kehoe and Prescott 1989), accountability (Fischer 
1993) and renegotiation (McCallum 1997) as well as being hardly compatible with 
stylized facts. 
Moreover, assumptions of benevolent planner models of inflation setting may 
eventually fit the characteristics of more industrialized economies in which the central 
banker has a high degree of institutional independence (or those where a dictatorial 
government sets the inflation rate), but appears particularly devoid of the generality 
needed in frameworks that should include inflation-setting mechanisms of countries 
where central banks are not independent.  
We must, therefore, more realistically argue that in most countries, the equilibrium 
inflation rate is the result of the interaction between multiple institutions and 
heterogeneous pressure groups. An example of a theoretical framework taking into 
account these considerations is the Pecchi and Piga (1999) model in which inflation is 
determined by the interplay of the government, central bank, a debt management 
agency, net creditors and taxpayers. 
In the model the final outcome is determined at the end of four sequential stages. In the 
first stage the debt management government agency announces the composition of debt 
to be issued deciding the share of nominal vis à vis real index bonds. In the second stage 
creditors purchase the debt at the internationally given interest rate plus expected 
inflation when they purchase nominal bonds. In the third stage net creditors and debtors 
exert lobbying pressure to affect government inflationary stance, and in the final stage 
the government acts as a Stackelberg leader trying with its pressure to condition the 
behaviour of the central bank in setting inflation. 
The model finally demonstrates that the equilibrium level of inflation is crucially 
affected by the relative strength of the net creditors’ vis à vis that of the taxpayers’ 
lobby. The impact of net creditors’ strength on equilibrium inflation is, in turn, affected 
by the relative degree of central bank independence (zero if the central bank is fully  
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independent), the government cost of deviations from its own target inflation and by the 
degree of central bank aversion to inflation. 
3  Descriptive evidence on the education-inflation nexus 
Very few empirical analyses measuring the relationship between education and 
inflationary expectations exist. Brischetto and De Brouwer (1999) analyse the 
Melbourne Institute Survey of Householders’ Inflation Expectations and find that these 
vary significantly with household personal characteristics. The authors find that higher 
educated individuals tend to have lower and more accurate inflation expectations.   
Along the same line, Bryan and Ventaku (2001) examine monthly data from the 
Inflation Psychology Survey (1996-2001) and negative and significant relationship 
between education and inflationary expectations. Lombardelli and Saleheen (2003) find 
that a level of education above high school is negatively and significantly correlated 
with inflationary expectations on a sample of around 2,000 individuals extracted from 
the UK Central Bank’s survey on inflationary expectations. 
The interpretation of this finding may be twofold. According to the Engel law rationale, 
it is possible that individuals with higher education, productivity and wages fall into an 
income class which consumes a bundle of goods with relatively lower average inflation 
rate. On this point Bagella et al. (1998) show that in Italy the cost of living calculated 
on the basis of the bundle of goods purchased by each income class deviates from the 
official ‘cost of living’ inflation index calculated by the domestic statistical institute 
(ISTAT). The authors find that higher-income classes have a slightly lower cost of 
living since they purchase a higher share of high-tech goods sold in highly competitive 
markets and a lower share of inferior goods generally sold in less competitive markets. 
On the same line, Idson and Miller (1997) investigate, using Consumer Expenditure 
Survey data, the determinants of household inflation rates for a sample of around 13,000 
US families spanning the period 1969 to 1987. As in the Bagella et al. (1998) paper, the 
authors identify household inflation rates on the basis of their specific consumption 
bundles. Their descriptive evidence shows that education is negatively related with 
inflation rates and the econometric estimates confirm that even after correcting for the 
effect of income, the significance of the negative link is confirmed.  
On the other hand, according to the consumers’ empowerment rationale, it is possible 
that the higher educated people have a more qualified cultural background and are 
closer to the homo economicus behaviour typical of rational, fully-informed, constrained 
maximizers. More specifically, less educated people may find it more difficult to adopt 
the principles of selective choice and may have a lower understanding of their role in 
reducing inflation than the consumers who exhibit elastic demand. This is also one of 
the interpretations that Brischetto and De Brouwer (1999) give to their results, arguing 
that experience and cultural background do matter in developing information-processing 
skills or in understanding how the economy works and in subsequently generating also 
lower inflationary expectations.  
The euro turnaround provides us with a lot of anecdotal evidence where, even in 
presence of competitive markets, price tags have been doubled (under the wrong 
equivalence of 1 euro with 1000 liras instead of 2000 liras) without generating  
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significant reductions of sales (Adriani, Marini and Scaramozzino 2003). In presence of 
(monopolistically) competitive markets and reasonable search costs (such as in the case 
of restaurants), the persistence of these abnormally high prices can be explained only by 
assuming the existence of a large ratio of uninformed consumers with poor 
information-processing skills and poor understanding of how economy works. 
4  Empirical analysis on the education-inflation nexus  
4.1  The empirical model 
Our first point is to test for the existence of a robust education-inflation nexus. As is 
well-known, the problem of endogeneity in testing the relationship between these two 
variables may be severe.  
We propose two alternative estimation methods. The first is a fixed effect estimate 
where inflation rates are regressed on human capital and proper controls in eight 5-year 
spells of panel data from 1963 to 2001 under the following specification:  
() ( ) 02 ln inf ln ti h i i
i
lm s X α αα β ε =++ + + ∑  
The second is a first-order autoregressive model  
() ( )( ) 01 1 2 ln inf ln inf ln tt h i i
i
lm lm s X α αα β ε − =+ + + + ∑  
where the dependent variable is the log of the average inflation rate in the last of the 
5-year period and regressors are education, the one period lagged dependent variable 
and a set of control variables measuring quality of financial institutions, which includes 
the stance of domestic monetary policy.  
More specifically, we consider as controls: 
EFW3am  the average growth of money supply (last five years) minus growth of real 
GDP (last ten years); 
EFW4  index of freedom to exchange with foreigners; 
EFW5  regulation of credit, labour and business; 
EFW4a  index of taxes on international trade; 
EFW4d  difference between the official and black market exchange rate; 
EFW4e  index of international capital market controls; 
EFW5a   index of credit market regulation.  
All these data are taken from the Economic Freedom of the World database issued by 
the Frazer Institute. 
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4.2  The choice of the human capital variable 
We consider three alternative proxies for the human capital variable. The first proxy, 
typically used in benchmark contributions of this type of literature (Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil  1992), is represented  by measures of school enrolment ratios at different 
educational levels, collected by the World Bank database and reported to the UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics by national authorities.2  
The use of this indicator has recently been the subject of severe criticism (Wossmann 
2003) since current enrolment ratios represent the investment of future, not current, 
workers and even if we lag this variable, it is very difficult to relate it exactly with the 
human capital investment of current workers. This may not represent a problem if the 
model is in steady state but is a problem so when we are in transition to the steady state, 
as in the human capital augmented exogenous growth model (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
1992) and in a framework of endogenous growth models (Bernanke and Gurkaynak 
2001). Furthermore, under the three rationales of the education-inflation nexus, the 
more educated people are supposed to know demand elasticity mechanisms better, to 
have lower inflationary expectations, and to lobby relatively more for lower inflation 
rates being net creditors. All these characteristics are better proxied by the human 
capital achievement of current working aged population rather than the human capital 
investment of current students and future workers. For this reason we prefer average 
schooling years of the working population. The variable is taken from the Barro and Lee 
(2000) dataset.  
The same methodology based on census and survey data on educational attainment 
levels, is applied by Barro and Lee, extending the coverage of countries and years. 
Attainment levels are based on UNESCO’s International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED) on the following scale: no schooling, incomplete first level, 
completed first level, entered the first stage of secondary level, entered second stage of 
secondary level and entered higher level.3  
                                                 
2   Usually in conditional convergence estimates we find measures of gross and net school enrolment 
ratios as proxies of human capital investment. The first is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of 
age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown, the 
second is the ratio of children of primary school age who are enrolled in school. Although the net 
enrolment ratio is more precise because it excludes over-aged students, we use the gross enrolment 
ratio in the attempt to capture more accurately the system’s coverage, because of the scarcity of data 
available for the net ratio. 
3  Barro and Lee (2000) also use data on adult illiteracy rates to estimate the fraction of the working 
aged population with no schooling when direct data from censuses or survey are not available.   
Since they observe a high correlation between the no-schooling fraction n0 and adult illiteracy   
rates (1-l) they estimate missing values of the fraction of the working aged population with no 








, 0 . 
Barro and Lee obtain 40 per cent of this information directly from census or survey data. They 
estimate missing observations on the basis of school enrolment ratio data. They use a perpetual 
inventory method, starting with the directly observed data points as benchmark stock using data on 
population by age to estimate survival rate, and they account for variations in the duration Da of 
schooling levels over time within a country.  
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The limitation in the use of years of schooling as a proxy for human capital investment 
is that all schooling years are equally weighted, regardless of the efficiency of the 
educational system, of the quality of teaching, of the educational infrastructure, or of the 
curriculum. To encompass this problem, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) devise an 
educational quality index as a third proxy of human capital. This is conveniently 
normalized by Wossmann (2003) for each country relative to the measure for the United 
States. We therefore input values for the average of schooling years and for the quality 
calculated by Hanushek and Kimko (2000) to calculate the third proxy of human capital 
investment.  
4.3  Econometric methodology issues 
As is well-known, under the second approach an important problem to be solved that is 
typical of dynamic panel estimates, is the likely correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the residual. Such correlation renders OLS estimates biased and 
inconsistent, even when error terms are not serially correlated (Arellano and Bover 
1995; Blundell and Bond 1998). 
A first generation first-differenced GMM approach tackles this issue by using lagged 
levels as instruments for first-differenced variables (Blundell and Bond 1988). The 
limitation of this approach lies in the fact that lagged levels are often poor instruments 
for first differences and that the estimator is shown to have poor finite sample properties 
when the autoregressive parameter (the correlation of output with its one period lagged 
value) approaches unity or the variance of individual effects, which are time invariant, 
is large with respect to time varying and transient shocks (Bond, Hoeffler and Temple 
2001). On the same issue, Blundell and Bond (1998) also observe that the first-
differenced GMM approach produces a large downward finite sample bias when the 
number of available periods is small. This is a problem that typically occurs in 
conditional convergence growth estimates which are conveniently estimated in short 
panels, given that output is highly persistent and only by using multi-year averages it is 
possible avoid modelling cyclical dynamics (Bond, Hoeffler and Temple 2001).  
More recently, a new ‘second generation’ system GMM combines the standard set of 
equations in first differences, typical of the ‘first generation’ first-differenced GMM 
(Arellano and Bond 1991), with a second set of equations in levels with suitably lagged 
first-differences as instruments (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998). 
This is the approach we follow in our econometric analysis.4 
4.4  Empirical results on the education-inflation nexus 
Fixed effect regression estimates on the inflation education nexus are presented in 
Tables 2a and 2b. The sample includes 102 countries observed on non-overlapping 
5-year data spells for the period 1963 to 2001 (for the list of developing countries 
included in the sample, see Appendix 1). In any spell the dependent variable is 
measured as the final year and the regressors are 5-year lagged levels. As we can see, 
the negative impact of education on inflation is significant both when we use plain 
                                                 
4  Fixed effect panel specifications have nonetheless been estimated and confirm the significance of the 
education-inflation nexus. Results are available from the authors on request.  
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average schooling years (Table 2a) and when we corrected for quality (Table 2b). The 
result is robust to the inclusion of different controls measuring monetary policy and 
quality of financial rules and institutions. The elasticity of education is quite high and 
not far from one. Hence, our result implies (under the linear approximation of the 
education-inflation nexus assumed by the model) that a 10 per cent increase in 
schooling years generates a 10 per cent decrease of inflation from its previous level. 
Estimates presented in Tables 2a and 2b also show that fixed effects are weak but still 
significant and that the goodness of fit is significantly higher when we introduce 
controls measuring monetary policy stance and quality of rules and financial 
institutions. 
To check the robustness of the inflation-education nexus, we propose an alternative 
system-GMM estimate where the impact of the lagged dependent variable is taken into 
account and where the potential endogeneity between inflation and education is reduced 
at minimum by instrumenting regressors different from the lagged dependent variable 
starting with their t-2 lags.  
The diagnostics of our estimates show that the hypothesis of overidentifying restrictions 
is rejected by the Sargan test while tests on residuals reject second order but not first 
order autocorrelation. This provides additional support for our choice to start from t-2 
lags when instrumenting our regressors. Our findings document the significance of the 
education variable and also that of the proxy for the stance of domestic monetary policy. 
The impact of the lagged dependent variable is weak. 
4.5  The education-inflation nexus and conditional convergence estimates 
Our framework for the econometric estimation of the relationship between education, 
inflation and growth is a generalized Solow growth model augmented for additional 
capital factors and allowing for the impact of additional components augmenting labour 
productivity.  
The model assumes that the observed countries have the following domestic production 
function: 
Yt = F(ΣKj, ΣAiL) = ΣKj
αj (ΣAitLt)
1-Σαj with  Σαj < 1  (1) 
Where L is the labour input, Ki includes the standard physical capital and other possible 
capital inputs (such as human capital) and  
A(t) = ΣiAi (t))   (2) 




    
where Ai is the i-th additional factor of conditional convergence affecting growth by 
increasing labour productivity. 
In the above model, physical and human capital follow the standard laws of motion and 
under the assumption of exogenous growth of the labour input,5 we may rewrite the 
                                                 
5  The exogeneity of labour force growth is a restrictive assumption which can, however, be accepted 
considering that changes in per capita income on fertility affect labour force with lags that go beyond 
the time interval considered in our estimates (especially panel estimates). Moreover, we may assume  
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production function in terms of output per efficiency units as y = k
Σαi where lowercase 
letters express input and output variables divided per efficiency units. Therefore, we can 
obtain the two standard growth equations: 
() jtk j t j t ks yn g k δ =− + + &    (3) 
() jth j t j t hs yn g h δ =− + + &    (4) 
under the assumption of a common depreciation rate (δ) and where g = Σigi. 
Following Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and relaxing the assumption that countries 
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Variables for our empirical analysis are taken from the World Bank database. The 
dependent variable Y/L is the real gross domestic product per working aged person, L is 
the working age population (population aged between 15-64). sk  is gross domestic 
investment over GDP and is calculated using values taken from Penn World Tables or, 
alternatively, World Bank data.6 The construction of the human capital proxies is 
discussed in detail in section 4.2. 
We perform our estimates on World Bank data for a dataset recording values for 102 
countries for a sample period ranging from 1963 to 2001. Data are grouped into eight 
5-year spells in order to provide acceptable time lags to test conditional convergence 
effects in growth estimates.7 We perform growth estimates using the basic Mankiw, 
                                                                                                                                               
that with migration and albeit imperfect international mobility of labour, the effect of domestic 
fertility on the labour force is limited.  
6  Penn World Tables (PWT) are the result of a United Nations International Comparison Project whose 
aim is to create information for consistent cross-country comparisons in time and space, starting from 
price surveys of identical sets of goods and services in different countries. One of the advantages in 
using PWT data is in the adoption of perpetual inventory methods which allows us to obtain more 
reliable information on net investment. The purpose of the PWT data is to obtain data which control 
for distortions arising from comparing value-based indicators across different industries. Such 
distortions may be of three types. First, measures based on comparisons between values of output and 
values of input, if not deflated by the specific (output and input) price indexes, may create biases in 
comparisons across time. Second, heterogeneity in market structures across sectors generates 
dispersion of prices above the competitive price level. As a consequence, industry-driven differences 
may be affected industry-specific differences in competitive environments. Third, indicators should be 
adjusted for input quality adjustment. Indeed, higher capital stock investment expenditure can conceal 
not just higher ‘quantity’ of the same capital good, but higher, same or less ‘quantity’ of a higher 
vintage capital good. For a detailed discussion of the methodology and of the critical issues of PWTs, 
see Heston and Summers (1991 and 1996). 
7  Conditional convergence growth estimates need to be estimated in short panels, since output is highly 




Romer and Weil (1992) approach in which the two main factors of growth are physical 
and human capital.  
The approach adopted for testing the education-inflation-growth nexus consists of three 
steps. First, in dynamic panel models we test the significance of the Mankiw-Romer-
Weil augmented Solow specification by performing a conditional convergence estimate 
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The rationale outlined in the previous section leads us again to use a system GMM 
approach where regressors are instrumented with their own t-2 (and available further) 
lagged values. 
Our evidence rejects the model confirming the puzzle of the insignificance of human 
capital in dynamic panel growth estimates both under a fixed effect (Islam 1995) and a 
system GMM estimate (Bond, Hoeffler and Temple 2001), while it is well-known that 
the variable turns out to be significant in cross-sectional estimates (Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil 1992) (Tables 4a-4b: columns 1 and 2). A likely interpretation of such a finding is 
that dynamic panels capture mainly within-country effects of changes in regressors 
across time, while cross-sectional estimates capture mainly the effect of the 
between-country distribution of a regressor on the dependent variable. Hence, from our 
results and others in the literature already mentioned, it seems that the between effect of 
human capital happens to be stronger than the within time effect.  
As a second step, we estimate a conditional convergence model in which inflation 
replaces human capital as a second factor of convergence in the empirical test of the 
































The adoption of a GMM system approach allows us to estimate a first order 
autoregressive model in levels of the following form: 
() ( )
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from both sides, we have a dependent variable in first 
differences and a coefficient of convergence which can be calculated as ( 4 α -1). By 
adopting the same system GMM approach with properly lagged instruments, we find 
(6)  
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that inflation is highly significant (Tables 4a-4b, column 3). This finding is also 
consistent with several results in the literature.8  
When we look at diagnostics of this equation, we find, however, that instruments 
selected perform poorly. 
As a third step, we try to improve the goodness of fit and selection of instruments in this 
equation by replacing lagged inflation with lagged education values as instruments 
(Tables 4a-4b: columns 4 and 5). Surprisingly we now find that the Sargan null 
hypothesis is not rejected and that the goodness of fit of the regression is now much 
higher. 
Another relevant point is that if we invert the steps of the procedure at stage three by 
instrumenting education with inflation, we still obtain unsatisfactory results with the 
education variable which remains insignificant.9  
4.6 Sensitivity  analysis 
We perform several robustness checks on the results presented in Tables 4a and 4b. In 
order to test the model on more homogeneous country subgroups in which the 
hypothesis of invariance of the production function is more likely to hold, we adopt the 
three-step procedure for different subgroups (non-oil countries, OECD and non-OECD 
countries, 15 EU countries and 15 non-EU) (Tables 5a to 8b). Our most important 
results outlined in the previous section remain remarkably stable. The human capital 
variables are not significant in the first step (columns 1 and 2), the inflation variable is 
significant when it replaces human capital (column 3), the goodness of fit is much 
higher and the test on the validity of the instruments improves when we add average 
schooling years corrected or not for quality among instruments (columns 4 and 5). 
                                                 
8  Earlier empirical papers identify a direct negative correlation between output growth and current and 
lagged inflation values (Grimes 1991; Stanners 1993; McTaggart 1992 and Smyth 1994), while 
Rudebusch and Wilcox (1994) illustrate a similar negative relationship with productivity. Bruno and 
Easterly (1998) analyse the inflation-economic growth relationship in the context of an inflation crisis 
(higher than 40 per cent inflation rates) and find that the latter is positive before the crisis (1.6 per cent 
on average), negative during (-1.2) and more positive than before after the crisis (2.6 per cent). 
Cukierman et al. (1993) overcome the potential endogeneity between economic growth and inflation 
by instrumenting the latter with a measure of central bank independence. Kormendi and Meguire 
(1985) and De Gregorio (1992, 1993) identify in the negative inflation-investment nexus the root of 
the impact of the former on economic growth. The rationale for this nexus is that in presence of high 
inflation rates, nominal prices are updated in an uncoordinated way and therefore more difficult to 
have a correct perception of changes in relative prices, and therefore, more difficult to evaluate 
investment profitability (Harberger 1998). In a framework of asymmetric information in which 
investment entails sunk costs and some form of irreversibility, high inflation rates may increase 
volatility of investment returns, therefore increasing the value of the option to wait or delaying the 
investment (Pindyck and Solimano 1993). An important normative consequence is that the stability of 
the macroeconomic framework is more beneficial to investment than frequent changes in fiscal 
policies.  
9   Results of these additional estimates are omitted for reasons of space and available from the authors 
on request.  
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5 Conclusions 
The mainstream literature on the impact of human capital on the levels and growth of 
per capita GDP mainly identifies a direct effect via returns to schooling and an indirect 
effect via reduction of fertility rates due to the higher female education. In this paper we 
document the existence of a third channel which operates through the education-
inflation-growth nexus.  
Our findings provide robust evidence on the education-inflation nexus at aggregate level 
in both fixed effect and system GMM estimates where inflation is regressed on 
education and proper control variables. This evidence parallels recent empirical findings 
documenting a negative relationship between education and inflationary expectations, 
on the one side, and ‘effective’ inflation rates calculated by evaluating price dynamics 
of effective consumption bundles, on the other side. 
We explain the education-inflation link by focusing on three rationales: (i) education 
raises consumers’ awareness of their power in contrasting producers’ inflationary 
pressures (‘reduced consumer empowerment’ rationale); (ii) more educated individuals 
have lower inflationary expectations since they are also wealthier and their consumption 
bundle is relatively less (more) intensive in inferior (superior) goods with higher (lower) 
inflation potential (Engle’s law rationale); (iii) more (less) educated and wealthier (less 
wealthy) individuals tend to be net creditors (debtors) in their maturity, thereby 
contributing to increase (reduce) the power of anti-inflationary lobbies (‘creditors 
pressure’ rationale). 
A second part of our results shows the strength of the second link in the education-
inflation-growth nexus, documenting how inflation rates are a significant factor of 
conditional convergence in growth estimates. 
The relationship between the first and the second link is demonstrated through a three-
step procedure. In the first we confirm the puzzle of the lack of significance of human 
capital investment in panel human capital augmented growth estimates of conditional 
convergence. In the second we show that inflation rates may successfully replace human 
capital investment in these estimates. In the third we find that goodness of fit and 
quality of instruments are significantly improved when we introduce instrument 
inflation with human capital investment. 
Overall, our findings open the path for a new unexplored field in the analysis of 
determinants of economic growth which deserves to be further explored and 
documented.  
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Appendix 1: List of countries included in econometric estimates 
OECD and/or high income countries 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, UK, USA  
Transition countries  
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
Developing countries 
Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Equador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Rep., Kuwait, Lesotho, 
Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad & 
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe   
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Appendix 2: Tables 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics of variables used in econometric estimates 
Table  2a  Fixed-effect non-autoregressive estimates of the education-inflation nexus (education 
variable: average schooling years) 
Table  2b  Fixed-effect non-autoregressive estimates of the education-inflation nexus (education 
variable: average schooling years corrected for quality) 
Table 3  System GMM estimates of the determinants of inflation 
Table  4a  Conditional convergence estimates (Heston-Summers corrected physical capital 
investment) 
Table 4b  Conditional convergence estimates (World Bank physical capital investment) 
Table  5a  Conditional convergence estimates (Heston-Summers corrected physical capital 
investment); OECD countries only 
Table  5b  Conditional convergence estimates (World Bank physical capital investment); OECD 
countries only 
Table  6a  Conditional convergence estimates (Heston-Summers corrected physical capital 
investment); non-OECD countries only  
Table 6b  Conditional convergence estimates (World Bank physical capital investment); non-OECD 
countries only  
Table  7a  Conditional convergence estimates (Heston-Summers corrected physical capital 
investment); non-oil countries only 
Table 7b  Conditional convergence estimates (World Bank physical capital investment); non-OECD 
countries only 
Table  8a  Conditional convergence estimates (Heston-Summers corrected physical capital 
investment); non-EU (15) countries only 




Variable legend for Tables 1-6 
Legend 
ngd  sum of the rate of growth of population, stock of capital depreciation and technological 
progress 
Gcapform  gross capital formation over GDP (WB data) 
Capfis Heston-Summers  corrected investment/GDP ratio 
Schoolsecgro  gross secondary school enrolment ratio 
 Schooltergro  gross tertiary school enrolment ratio 
 Averschol  average schooling of the working population 
 Schoolqua  average schooling of the working population corrected for quality  
QIRMP  quality of institutional rules  
 
Legend 
REER    real effective exchange rate (see Table 2 legend)  
QIRMP    index of the quality of institutions and of economic policies. It is measured as a simple 
average of the following composed indicators:  
 
  1)  Size of government: expenditures, taxes, and enterprises 
   a  General government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption 
    b  Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP 
     c  Government enterprises and investment as a percentage of GDP 
    d  Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold to which it applies) (i) top marginal tax rate 
(excluding applicable payroll taxes) (ii) top marginal tax rate (including applicable payroll 
taxes) 
 
   2)  Legal structure and security of property rights 
    a  Judicial independence—the judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by 
the government or parties in disputes 
    b  Impartial court—a trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the 
legality of government actions or regulation 
    c  Protection of intellectual property 
    d  Military interference in rule of law and the political process 
    e  Integrity of the legal system 
 
  3)  Access to sound money 
    a   Average annual growth of the money supply in the last five years minus average annual 
growth of real GDP in the last ten years 
    b  Standard inflation variability in the last five years 
    c  Recent inflation rate 
    d  Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad 
 
  4)  Freedom to exchange with foreigners 
   a  Taxes on international trade (i) revenue from taxes on international trade as a 
percentage of exports plus imports (ii) mean tariff rate (iii) standard deviation of tariff 
rates 
    b  Regulatory trade barriers (i) hidden import barriers—no barriers other than published 
tariffs and quotas (ii) costs of importing—the combined effect of import tariffs, license 
fees, bank fees, and the time required for administrative redtape raise the costs of 
importing equipment 
    c  Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size 
    d  Difference between official exchange rate and black market rate 
    e  International capital market controls (i) access of citizens to foreign capital markets and 
foreign access to domestic capital markets (ii) restrictions on the freedom of citizens to 
engage in capital market exchange with foreigners index of capital controls among 
13 IMF categories.  
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  5)  Regulation of credit, labour, and business 
   a  Credit market regulations (i) ownership of banks—percentage of deposits held in 
privately owned banks (ii) competition—domestic banks face competition from foreign 
banks (iii) extension of credit—percentage of credit extended to private sector 
(iv ) avoidance of interest rate controls and regulations that lead to negative real interest 
rates (v) interest rate controls—interest rate controls on bank deposits and/or loans are 
freely determined by the market. 
     b  Labour market regulations (i) impact of minimum wage—the minimum wage, set by law, 
has little impact on wages because it is too low or not obeyed (ii) hiring and firing 
practices—hiring and firing practices of companies are determined by private contract 
(iii)  share of labour force whose wages are set by centralized collective bargaining 
(iv) unemployment benefits—the unemployment benefits system preserves the incentive 
to work (v) use of conscripts to obtain military personnel. 
     c  Business regulations (i) price controls—extent to which businesses are free to set their 
own prices (ii) administrative conditions and new businesses—administrative procedures 
are an important obstacle to starting a new business (iii) time with government 
bureaucracy—senior management spends a substantial amount of time dealing with 
government bureaucracy (iv) starting a new business—starting a new business is 
generally easy (v) irregular payments—irregular, additional payments connected with 
import and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, 




Descriptive statistics of variables used in econometric estimates 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  dev.  Min  Max 
Inflation 874  31.447  213.399 -13.056  4157.317 
EFW3a 685  30.736  157.736  -64.6  2294.3 
EFW4  690  6.021 1.697 1.660 9.764 
EFW4a 698  6.070  2.621  0  10 
EFW4d 768  7.374  3.769  0  10 
EFW4e 782  2.974  3.289  0  10 
EFW5  654  5.366 1.109 2.473 8.755 
EFW5a 749  5.839  2.737  0  10 
Averschool 558  5.469  2.695  0.2  12.005 
Averschoolqua 523  5.715 3.914 0.183  16.677 
        
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  dev.  Min  Max 
Ln(Inflation) 825  2.076 1.326  -2.882 8.333 
Ln(EFW3a) 639  2.365  1.178 -1.897  7.738 
Ln(EFW4) 690  1.746  0.338 0.507 2.279 
Ln(EFW4a) 673  1.719  0.596 -2.302  2.302 
Ln(EFW4d) 648  2.087  0.542 -1.609  2.302 
Ln(EFW4e) 481  1.360  0.694 -0.956  2.302 
Ln(EFW5) 654  1.656  0.229 0.905 2.169 
Ln(EFW5a) 697  1.724  0.571 -1.791  2.302 
Ln(Averschool) 558  1.545  0.613  -1.609  2.485 




Fixed-effect non-autoregressive estimates of the education-inflation nexus 
(education variable: average schooling years) 
 











































































[-2.56]     
-1.018 
[-3.86]     
Ln(EFW5) 
      
-2.04 
[-4.81]    
-2.969 




       
-0.247 
[-1.70]        
Ln(EFW4d) 
        
-0.259 
[-2.27]       
Ln(EFW4e) 




[-3.76]    
Ln(EFW5a) 































F test  























R-sq  Within  0.0342 0.1643 0.2316 0.2995 0.1741 0.2217 0.3879 0.2287 0.3415 0.1968 0.2861 
R-sq Overall  0.0684  0.3002  0.3397 0.322  0.2679 0.29  0.3572 0.3282 0.3746 0.3022 0.2983 
























Observations  507 434 426 400 412 379 306 413 315 420 407 






Fixed-effect non-autoregressive estimates of the education-inflation nexus 
(education variable: average schooling years corrected for quality) 











































































[-2.48]     
-0.99 
[-3.65]     
Ln(EFW5) 
      
-2.138 
[-4.91]    
-3.038 




       
-0.231 
[-1.54]        
Ln(EFW4d) 
        
-0.254 
[-2.19]       
Ln(EFW4e) 




[-3.51]    
Ln(EFW5a) 































F test  























R-sq Within  0.0277  0.1625  0.2303 0.302  0.1718 0.2207 0.3954 0.2282 0.3469 0.1982 0.2891 
R-sq Overall  0.1068  0.301  0.3577 0.3452 0.273  0.288 0.3961  0.3434  0.4056 0.308  0.3181 
























Observations  477 412 405 380 391 357 289 392 298 398 386 
Groups  90 80 80 80 80 79 75 80 76 80 80 
Notes:  Inflation = consumer Price (annual %)—final value for each time section;  Averschool = average of schooling years;  Averschoolqua = average of schooling years 
weighted for quality of institutions;  EFW3a = average growth of money supply (last 5 yrs) minus growth of real GDP(last 10 yrs);  EFW4 = freedom to exchange with 
foreigners;  EFW5 = regulation of credit, labour, business;  EFW4a = taxes on international trade;  EFW4d = diff. official exchange rate and black market rate;  







System GMM estimates of the determinants of inflation  
 
Dependent variable: INFL: log of the end of period inflation rate 
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Ln(Averschoolqua) 



























[-3.97]    -1.696 
[-3.29]   
Ln(EFW5a) 
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F test  







































Observations  294 304 282 292 
Groups  75 76 71 72 




Conditional convergence estimates 
(Heston-Summers corrected physical capital investment)  
 
Dependent variable: Ln(GDP per worker) 
   GMM (1)  GMM (2)  GMM (3)  GMM (4)  GMM (5) 




















































































































Observations  569 539 588 437 418 
Groups  93 86  118 91 85 
Instruments  102 102 109  80  80 
Notes:  Sample period (1963-2001) (eight 5-year spells of panel data). 
  Columns 1 and 2 augmented with human capital (average years of schooling and average years 
of schooling corrected for quality, respectively). Column 3 augmented with inflation. Columns 4 
and 5 augmented with inflation using human capital among instruments (average years of 
schooling and average years of schooling corrected for quality, respectively).  
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Table 4b 
Conditional convergence estimates 
(World Bank physical capital investment)  
 
Dependent variable: Ln(GDP per worker) 



















































































F test  















































Observations  577 543 596 448 428 
Groups  99 89  125 93 87 
Instruments  102 102 109  80  80 
Notes:  See notes to Table 4a.  
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Table 5a 
Conditional convergence estimates  
(Heston-Summers corrected physical capital investment) 
OECD countries only  
 
Dependent variable: Ln(GDP per worker) 
   GMM (1)  GMM (2)  GMM (3)  GMM (4)  GMM (5) 






































































F test  











Sargan test  



































Observations  185 182 186 155 155 
Groups  29 28 28 27 27 
Instruments  102 102 109  80  80 





Conditional convergence estimates 
 (World Bank physical capital investment) 
OECD countries only  
 
Dependent variable: Ln(GDP per worker) 
   GMM (1)  GMM (2)  GMM (3)  GMM (4)  GMM (5) 






































































F test  















































Observations  177 174 177 155 155 
Groups  29 28 28 27 27 
Instruments 102  102  109  80  80 




Conditional convergence estimates  
(Heston-Summers corrected physical capital investment) 
Non-OECD countries only  
 
Dependent variable: Ln(GDP per worker) 





















































































F test  















































Observations  384 357 402 282 263 
Groups  64 58 90 64 58 
Instruments 102  102  109  80  80 
Notes:  See notes to Table 4a.  
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Table 6b 
 Conditional convergence estimates  
(World Bank physical capital investment) 
Non-OECD countries only  
 
Dependent variable: Ln(GDP per worker) 





















































































F test  















































Observations  400 369 419 293 273 
Groups  70 61 97 66 60 
Instruments 102  102  109  80  80 




Conditional convergence estimates  
(Heston-Summers corrected physical capital investment) 
Non-oil countries only  
 
Dependent variable: Ln(GDP per worker) 





















































































F test  















































Observations  564 534 577 432 413 
Groups  92 85  116 90 84 
Instruments  102 102 109  80  80 




Conditional convergence estimates  
(World Bank physical capital investment) 
Non-OECD countries only  
 
Dependent variable: Ln(GDP per worker) 





















































































F test  















































Observations  565 531 578 439 419 
Groups  96 86  121 91 85 
Instruments 102  102  109  80  80 




Conditional convergence estimates  
(Heston-Summers corrected physical capital investment) 
Non-EU (15) countries only  
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(GDP per worker) 





















































































F test  















































Observations  473 443 484 355 336 
Groups  79 72  103 77 71 
Instruments  102 102 109  80  80 
Notes:  See notes to Table 4a.  
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Table 8b 
Conditional convergence estimates  
(World Bank physical capital investment) 
Non-EU (15) countries only  
 
Dependent variable: Ln(GDP per worker) 





















































































F test  















































Observations  488 454 499 366 346 
Groups  85 75  110 79 73 
Instruments  102  102  109 80 80 
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